introduction Today, academic studies are one of the basic sources of scholarly and scientific advancement.
1 Commonly discussed issues include countries' publication performance and their relative contribution to knowledge in the world.
2 Some countries have instituted financial incentive policies with the aim of increasing their output of academic publications. Turkey is one such country that has instituted a financial incentive policy to stimulate its research productivity. As a country, Turkey ranks eighteenth worldwide, both in terms of population and economic size, and its Researchers in Argentina and Chile found that the money paid per paper led to an increase in the number of publications, especially by young researchers, by 10 to 20 per cent. 11 In Brazil a quasi-experimental study reported the results of a case study conducted at the BIOTA program. The study found that researchers in the experimental group, who were paid per paper, increased their publications by 10 to 20 per cent compared to the control group.
12
The ex post incentive payment program instituted in Turkey is similar to those instituted in other countries. 13 In the United Kingdom, which has a comparable policy, incentive payments were found to have increased both the quantity and the quality of publications.
14 However, it is debated whether incentive payment contributes to or impairs the quality of publications. This debate was intensified by the finding in a study by Butler, 15 which found that an incentive payment policy increased the quantity but impaired the quality of publications.
16
Australia updated its incentive payment policy with the aim of increasing the quality of publications rather than the quantity, and it was found that both the number and quality of publications increased.
17
Having noticed no increase in the quality of publications, China and Korea, like Australia, also updated their incentive policies. After the reform, these countries started to pay researchers only for publications indexed in SSCI/SCI/A&HCI by considering the impact factor. It was then seen that both the number and the quality of publications increased. 18 In the same way, Norway also started to pay only for publications in prestigious journals with high impact factors, and it was determined that this led to an increase in the quantity and quality of the publications by researchers holding doctor, professor, and assistant professor titles.
19
While some countries saw an increase in both the number and the quality of publications after reforms to their national incentive policies, other countries saw a decrease in publication quality or other problems after instituting a policy. For example, it was claimed that the system called Evaluation Methodology in the Czech Republic, which involved payment per ex post publication, encouraged some lecturers to be opportunistic. 20 Moreover, it has been argued that incentive mechanisms with unclear rules may tempt researchers to submit manuscripts to lowquality or even fraudulent publishers to earn rewards. 21 Thus the beneficial outcomes of an incentive payment policy cannot be assumed, and the outcomes need to be tested on a country-by-country basis.
22
Another concern is that lecturers who are motivated to publish more to earn money may neglect the instruction and other services they provide to students, which could in turn decrease student satisfaction.
23
Moreover, some argue that financial incentives can cause ethical problems such as adding the names to a paper of authors who hardly contributed to it, so-called gift authorship.
24
Like the other countries mentioned here, Turkey also wishes to increase the quantity and quality of its publications through ex post incentive payments. However, to the best of this researcher's knowledge, there are no qualitative studies in the literature that focus on what researchers think about academic incentive systems. The claim that a publication incentive can lead to ethical problems still needs confirmation, and a study is needed to test the postulation that an incentive system can impair the quality of services offered by faculty to their students. With these ends in mind, this study sought to answer the following research questions about the ex post incentive system in Turkey, which, like systems adopted by other countries, involves payment per publication:
1. Does it increase the total number of publications? 2. Does it improve the quality of publications? 3. Does it affect student satisfaction with instructional services provided by faculty? 4. Does it cause ethical problems? academic incentive allowance in turkey A system of academic incentive allowance in Turkey, which features ex post funding for publications, was introduced in all state universities in late December 2015 as a state policy, and the payments started in 2016. Researchers are paid per article, project, and paper presentation on the condition that they are published. Thus, the policy aims to encourage faculty members to get their articles published in national and especially international journals, and to carry out projects and participate in international congresses and symposia. 25 However, Turkey's program is intended only for faculty members from all ranks at state universities. Those who work at private universities or researchers who do not work at universities cannot benefit from this incentive. (There is no distinction between researchers and lecturers for faculty in Turkey. All academics are required to teach students, run student services, and write papers.)
Higher sums are paid for articles published in journals indexed by SSCI/SCI/A&HCI. Relatively less money is paid for articles published in journals in other international indexes, such as the Directory of Open Access Journals and EBSCO, or in national journals. (An article indexed in SSCI/SCI/A&HCI is paid four times more compared with other articles.) Conference papers need to be presented at international congresses or symposia and published at least as an abstract in proceedings in order for the author to get paid. No money is paid for papers presented at national congresses. Higher amounts of money are paid for international projects than for national projects. Academics are also paid for the citations to their works throughout the previous year.
In Turkey the salary of an associate professor is approximately $1500 USD a month, at baseline. Academics who publish are paid extra for their publications. For example, two articles published in a journal indexed by SSCI/SCI/A&HCI amount to thirty points, which means $900 USD in extra payment. This amount is paid in twelve installments (added to the salary) over a year. As another example, a researcher who has two articles published and indexed in SSCI/SCI/A&HCI and has presented four papers at international congresses earns sixty points, which translate into $1800 USD in extra payment for the year.
However, no matter how many articles an academic publishes in prestigious international indexes or how many papers he or she presents at international congresses, that academic can get a maximum of thirty points for articles, thirty for projects, thirty for conference papers presented and published, and thirty for citations. These limits are set to encourage academics to conduct international projects and make presentations at international congresses instead of concentrating only on articles in indexed journals.
method To achieve an in-depth exploration of Turkey's ex post publication incentive system, the researcher used a convergent parallel mixed-methods design, with equivalent emphasis on quantitative and qualitative data. One of the strengths of the present study is that the researcher used methodological triangulation to validate the results. 26 The data collected during the qualitative portion of the study informed some of the methodological choices made for the quantitative portion of the study.
Participants Providing Qualitative Data
The volunteer interview participants were individuals who had been working at a state university for the last four years. This criterion ensured that the researchers recruited would be knowledgeable about both the ex post funding period and the time before it. Based on data from Turkey's Higher Education Council, there were 120,123 faculty members in 112 state universities that met the criterion of time spent at a state university. 27 However, because the researcher also wanted to collect data about how ex post funding has influenced the instruction and other services offered by lecturers, he narrowed recruitment to the five state universities that measured their students' satisfaction with instructional activities using the same validated instrument. These universities are located in different parts of Turkey and were founded at different times. The researcher obtained data about student satisfaction with instructional activities and other services at the five universities for the four-year period.
Faculty at these five universities were informed about the study through an email message asking them to take part in an interview. Forty-six faculty members responded to the email, but only thirty-eight of them met the criterion of time spent at the institution. At this point, the researcher recruited a total of fifteen interview participants from different fields of study and at different academic ranks (three faculty members from each university). For each university, the first participant did not have a PhD degree (a research assistant or instructor), the second was a new PhD graduate, and the third was an experienced academic (an associate professor or full professor). Although the researcher attempted to recruit an equal number of male and female participants, it was not possible given the rank criteria. The characteristics of the participants are presented in Table 1 . 
Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis
A semi-structured interview composed of six main questions and some accompanying probe questions was developed to collect qualitative data from the fifteen participants. After the questions were drafted, the views of two professors, who are knowledgeable about the incentive program and about qualitative research, were solicited. The interview questions were then piloted with three researchers: a research assistant with four years of service, a researcher who holds a PhD degree, and a professor. As a result of the pilot, two probe questions were replaced with new ones. The three researchers in the piloting stage were not included in the group of participants.
Permission to proceed with the qualitative portion of the study was obtained from the researcher's institutional review board, which examined the interview questions and consent form and provided guidance. Before the interview took place, each participant gave informed consent to participate. The fifteen face-to-face interviews took 432 minutes in all. The interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. All interview participants were invited to check the accuracy of their transcript and to see whether everything in it genuinely reflected their opinions. The data were kept safe and private for later reference if the need should arise.
To analyse the qualitative data, the researcher carefully read all the interview transcripts and field notes to get familiar with the data. Then the data were coded and analysed using computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (NVivo 10). The analysis began with free coding before a coding structure was created. The importance of context, process-related reasons, and their mutual effects was taken into consideration during coding. The codes obtained were categorized according to similarities and differences by comparing them. Meaningful and holistic categories were combined to form themes. The researcher used annotations and memos to facilitate analysis and to provide rich data for later interpretation. The themes that resulted from the qualitative data analysis inform the sub-headings in the results section, wherein the researcher has quoted passages from the interview transcripts, translated into English, to illustrate participants' views.
Quantitative Data Sets first data set
In the qualitative stage of the study, some participants remarked that national congresses had changed their names to international after Turkey's incentive program was introduced, given that national ones do not qualify for payment. They pointed out that this was an ethical problem. These claims urged the researcher to examine national and international congresses and symposia before and after the introduction of the program. Two popular websites that announce congresses, 28 and the websites of the congresses themselves, provided the data for the first quantitative data set.
According to these sources, there were 476 congresses regularly held annually in Turkey over the last four years. The names of fifty congresses were randomly chosen using SPSS (a statistical software package). These congresses were examined with respect to their being national or international in name in the last four years and especially after the incentive program started.
second data set The researcher wanted to learn if the incentive program has negatively affected student satisfaction with instructional services. There are 112 state universities in Turkey, which are all eligible for incentive program benefits, but not all of them measure their students' satisfaction with instructional activities. According to official records, only twelve state universities in Turkey regularly measured students' satisfaction over the last four years. However, seven of those universities used different data collection tools whose validation is not clear, and only five universities from different regions of Turkey used the same valid and reliable data collection tool and recorded the results. This data set from five universities includes responses from 128,258 students. The common data collection tool used by these five universities is the University Students Satisfaction Scale. This scale was originally developed by Oliver, 29 and it was adapted into Turkish by the Academic Evaluation Board of Ondokuz Mayıs University. 30 The reliability of the instructional services sub-dimension of the seven-item Likert scale is 0.71. Student satisfaction in each period (before and after the incentive) was compared statistically using a Wilcoxon test because the data were not distributed normally.
third data set The third data set was assembled to determine whether the number of Turkey-based publications in prestigious journals indexed in SSCI/SCI/ A&HCI had changed over the four-year period. To this end, the number of Turkey-based articles in the Web of Science in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 was determined in late January 2018. The data were further sorted by time before and after the incentive program's institution.
fourth data set One of the participants suggested a comparison of the publication performances of state and private universities as measured by articles indexed in SSCI/SCI/A&HCI. The participant hypothesized that, if the program has influenced the number of quality publications, the number of publications indexed in SSCI/SCI/A&HCI for researchers in state universities should increase after the start of the program. The private universities would offer a control group because the incentive system does not apply to faculty at private institutions. According to data from the Council of Higher Education, there are sixty-eight private universities in Turkey with 12,314 lecturers.
In the Web of Science database, Turkey-based articles published over the last four years were counted (two years before and two years after the incentive allowance began), and the total number of publications by researchers from state and private universities between 2014 and 2017 was determined separately. The total publication counts were then divided by the total number of researchers in each group of universities to calculate an average number of publications per researcher per year.
results

Ex Post Incentive and Ethical Problems
In the current Turkish incentive system, it is possible to make the same amount of money by publishing three articles in journals not indexed in SSCI/SCI/A&HCI as it is by publishing one article in a journal indexed in SSCI/SCI/A&HCI. Participants P2, P5, P9, and P12, who frequently mentioned this problem in the interviews, stated that publishing in journals indexed in SSCI/SCI/A&HCI is a demanding and lengthy process. The participants pointed out that the incentive program also pays for articles indexed in some international indexes other than SSCI/SCI/A&HCI. These participants also remarked that some of the journals not indexed in SSCI/SCI/A&HCI do not have a robust peer-review process. They provided examples of how the incentive program has led to ethical violations. For example, P9 summarized the situation this way:
The incentive system encourages articles not only in prestigious international journals but also in national ones. Therefore, researchers do not bother to publish in prestigious journals; they submit articles to journals where peer review is dubious and the article gets published in two or three weeks. But this is not the case with journals indexed in [SSCI/SCI/A&HCI]. Publishing in these journals is a labour-intensive process. Thus, the researcher thinks, 'Why bother [publishing in journals indexed in SSCI/SCI]? I can publish in any other journal and earn the same amount of money.' Expressed in terms similar to those of P9, P2 remarked on a tendency to doubt the wisdom of labouring for SSCI/SCI/A&HCI publications that has emerged in academic circles after the introduction of the incentive program. The alternative, added P2, is 'more money in a short time with less effort. ' According to some participants, another ethical problem caused by the incentive policy has to do with international congresses. In the incentive system, no payment is made to researchers who present papers at national congresses and symposia because the incentive system aims to encourage attendance at international scientific meetings. However, the participants stated that organizations or participants can resort to unethical practices to benefit from the rules of the incentive program.
On this point, P6 stated, 'heaven knows why! A national congress which has been held for ten years. . . was converted to international. Why? Isn't it clear why?' P8 also commented that many national congresses were changed to international after the introduction of the incentive payment policy. P15 clarified the issue by stating, 'Almost all of the participants are Turkish; only the names of five foreigners are added to the scientific committee, and then they call it international; everyone is happy. Anyone who organizes and/or attends such congresses commits an ethical violation. ' As such complaints recurred across interviews, the researcher examined whether the names of national congresses were changed to international congresses. With this aim in mind, the first data set was collected and analysed, and the findings are graphed in Figure 1 .
As can be seen in Figure 1 , some congresses held as national congresses were changed to international congresses. For example, the National Elementary Education Congress changed its name to the International Elementary Education Congress. Ten of the congresses that changed their names to international congresses were chosen randomly using SPSS. Then, the percentage of foreign attendees to the congresses was examined by looking at proceedings or books of abstracts. The average rate of foreigners attending the congresses was 2.78 per cent before the incentive program was introduced, and it rose to 2.87 per cent after the incentive. This indicates that the nature of the organizations did not change, only the name. These quantitative findings are compatible with the qualitative findings in which interviewees remarked that the incentive payment plan had been exploited and so had created ethical problems.
Ex Post Incentive and Student Satisfaction
The interview participants did not all agree on whether the incentive program had affected how well they instruct their students. Twelve of the fifteen participants stated that the program did not have an impact on their teaching, and they claimed that the time and effort they allocated to teaching was almost the same before and after the program was introduced.
However, the remaining three participants admitted to making some compromises. P2 said, 'Yes actually. . . sometimes when I have to make a choice between participating in a congress and giving classes, I opt for going to congresses now.' P11 stated, 'I have financial problems, and the [incentive program] is important for me! There is no need for telling lies; I get less prepared for lessons, but I enter lessons on time.' P11 added, 'In the past, we used to chat with students more; I used to listen to their problems. Now I might be more willing to publish (to earn more money).' P6, who is the chair of a department, observed that some faculty members now attach less importance to instructional activities and that student satisfaction has decreased.
To supplement the divided opinion of the interviewees, the researcher analysed the second data set: student surveys at five universities that use the same instrument to measure student satisfaction with the instructional services provided to them by university lecturers. The results of analysing the second data set are plotted in Figure 2 .
While students' satisfaction with educational services before the academic incentive allowance was a mean of 4.10 at these five universities, it decreased to a mean of 3.45 after the incentive system started. At all five universities that collected comparable data, the level of student satisfaction decreased statistically significantly in the period after the incentive allowance system was introduced. This change might be attributed to some other mediating variables, but instructor behaviour as influenced by the incentive plan seems like a reasonable explanation.
Some of the interview participants who did not believe their teaching had suffered as a result of the incentive plan did describe, at moments in the interviews, how their or their colleagues' motivation and behaviour had changed in observable ways after the introduction of the plan. In this context, P15 remarked, 'I do not disrupt educational services [meaning lesson hours] but I run to be at the computer. Yes, I listen to students' problems less; I allocate less time to solve their problems. I and my students are aware of it. But incentive allowance has terribly motivated me.' On the same issue, P8 made the following frank statement about the effect of the program: Now, when students come to my office, I seek ways to send them off as quickly as possible. One of my students even said, 'You used to chat with us more in the past and cared about our problems. Why did you change?' I questioned myself upon this sentence, and actually I could not find any reason for this change other than the [incentive program].' Ex Post Incentive and the Number and Quality of Publications During the interviews, the participants frequently noted that the incentive program was a source of motivation that had inspired them, and others they had observed, to publish more. All participants agreed that the incentive system has increased the number of publications because it is an effective source of external motivation. P3 said, 'I published more articles and participated in more international congresses after the [program] started. Thanks to the motivation generated by allowance, I get published almost twice as much.' P7 stated, 'money impels people to move; people move if money is involved. I got into action as well.' P9 stated that some lecturers she knew started to publish more to benefit from the program: 'Lecturers who used to sleep, so to speak, started to go to congresses, published articles, and received incentive allowance.' As all the participants agreed that the program had increased the number of publications, the researcher turned to the third data set to corroborate their remarks. The findings are presented in Figure 3 .
The mean score of Turkish researchers before the program (2014 and 2015) was 18.69 (using the point system of the incentive program), and the mean score of the researchers after the program started (2016 and 2017) was calculated to be 40.67. 31 After the start of the program, while there was a significant increase in publication scores obtained from articles published in national refereed journals, from international congresses, and from articles published in journals included in international indexes other than SSCI/SCI/A&HCI, there was a decrease in 2017 in the number of articles published in journals indexed in SSCI/SCI/A&HCI.
For another analysis of publishing trends over the four-year period, Figure 4 isolates the data for Turkey-based publications in journals indexed in SSCI/SCI/A&HCI, specifically.
Turkey-based publications indexed in SSCI/SCI/A&HCI increased in 2014, 2015, and 2016. However, the number of publications indexed in SSCI/SCI/A&HCI decreased 10.72 per cent in 2017. The lack of a decrease figure 3 . The publication performance of researchers before and after the incentive system, as measured by point values assigned by the incentive scoring system. in the number of publications in journals indexed in SSCI/SCI/A&HCI in 2016, after the academic incentive started, conflicts with the qualitative findings. However, it is also possible that a considerable number of studies published in 2016 could have been submitted before the program was introduced, but this is only an assumption. When data from 2015 and 2017 are compared, a decrease in number is seen. There may be other mediating variables that can explain this decrease, so having data from 2018 would help to establish whether the decrease is really a trend attributable to the incentive program.
During the interviews, P4 claimed that the program increased both the number of publications and the quality of publications, and P7 and P14 stated that the program did not influence the quality of publications. However, the other twelve participants all claimed that the program had decreased the quality of publications based on their own experiences and observations. P4, who thought that the program increased both the quality and quantity of publications, said, 'if the number of publications increases, then naturally the quality increases as well. The more apples you grow, the higher the chances that you grow quality apples.' When asked if he had experienced or observed anything to support this, he responded, 'No, I haven't, but this is a logical estimation. This is what happens in general.' P7 and P14 stated that the number of publications increased but the quality of publications did not change, and to support their claims they argued that researchers who can produce quality publications would do so and that researchers who cannot produce quality publications would generate subpar articles.
The argument that the quality of publications had decreased was emphatically made by one participant, P15, who was a full professor. The views that P15 expressed about the causal relation between the program and publication quality are worth quoting at length:
Yes, the number of publications has increased, but the quality of publications has decreased. I know the incentive systems in the world and in Turkey very well. The system applied in Turkey is not very much different from the ones in some countries in the world. Our system additionally pays for national articles and international congresses. This is the only difference. . . In our system, an article indexed in SSCI is much more promoted. But because of some cultural norms and underdeveloped academic culture and scientific research logic, we adopted a behavioural pattern based on the idea that 'we can make three or four bad publications rather than making one good publication,' and we exploited the congresses. We tend to publish in fake journals.
The views expressed by P15 contend that sociocultural norms and academic culture interact with policy, and they provide a perspective on how the incentive system could lead to a decrease in the quality of publications. P15 continued, Laws have their spirits. Turkey designed its incentive system by considering good examples of systems in the world. But this system did not comply with our cultural dynamics. We sought ways of exploiting it. The result? The number of publications increased but quality plumbed the depths.
P6, who pointed out that the program aimed to increase the quality of publications, said, 'quantity increased but quality decreased.' P8 argued that thinking that quality can be increased through external motivation like money is a capitalist understanding. She also emphasized that it is difficult to increase the quality of publications of researchers who are not knowledgeable about research methods, foreign languages, and academic writing just by offering an incentive, and she remarked that the number of publications increased but the quality of publications decreased. P8 said, 'You understand what I mean if you have a look at the number of Turkey-based articles in SCI before and after the [program] .' P9 shared one of his experiences as follows: 'I tell research assistants to submit their articles to some journals with high impact factors. They tell me that it takes too long and much effort to get published in these journals. They offer journals with low impact factors. ' As was explained in the method section about the fourth data set, one of the interviewees suggested making a comparison of publications by academics in state and private institutions. This suggestion came from P14: 'Let me tell you how you can reveal the effect of the incentive allowance on the quality of publications. The researchers who work for private universities are not paid incentive allowance but those who work at state universities are paid. Compare the number of SSCI/SCI publications per lecturer for state and private universities before and after the incentive allowance.' Inspired by this idea, the researcher decided to test it.
The average number of publications indexed in SSCI/SCI/A&HCI per researcher working at private universities, which do not pay an incentive allowance, and the average number of publications per researcher who work at state universities, which do pay an incentive allowance, were compared before and after the introduction of the program. The findings are given in Figure 5 .
The average number of publications per researcher at state universities was 0.218 in the two years before the program was introduced (2014 and 2015) and was 0.215 for the two years after (2016 and 2017). By comparison, in private universities, the number of publications per researcher was 0.245 in 2014 and 2015, and was 0.267 in 2016 and 2017. The drop-off in 2017 for state faculty, contrasted with the steady, slight incline for private faculty across all four years, supports the surmise of P14. discussion and conclusion In this study it was determined that having a national ex post financial reward system for research publications is an important source of motivation for researchers. Similarly, other studies focusing on incentive payment in different countries have also found it to be an important source of motivation. 32 However, the incentive system in Turkey, which planted a desire to make more money by increasing one's number of publications, has evidently caused some researchers to act opportunistically and thus has led to some ethical problems or exacerbated existing ones.
With incentive allowances for articles in national journals and in international journals included in indexes other than SSCI/SCI/A&HCI, the system in Turkey opened up an opportunity that some researchers have exploited. As for publication quality, there was a decrease in Turkeybased publications in SSCI/SCI/A&HCI in 2017. In addition, some congress organizers changed the name of their national congress to an international one seemingly for the sole purpose of allowing members an opportunity to receive incentive payment for participation. Furthermore, the incentive program appears to have lowered students' satisfaction with the instructional services they receive from their faculty at state universities in Turkey. After the program started, a statistically significant decrease was found in the reported level of student satisfaction. A program that rewards the number and quality of publications -thus increasing the pull of one faculty priority (research) relative to another (instruction) -might be expected to divert some instructors' time and attention away from teaching to the detriment of student satisfaction.
Turkey designed its incentive allowance system based on the experience of Norway and China. Therefore, the system is essentially the same as those originally instituted in China and Norway. Some studies have revealed that in countries such as Norway, Australia, South Korea, China, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, where ex post funding incentive payment exists, the system has increased the number of publications.
33
In the present study, it was determined that the program increased the number of publications in journals other than those indexed in SSCI/ SCI/A&HCI. Problems were experienced in China, South Korea, and Norway, as the incentive system did not contribute to the quality of publications. Later on, the systems were revised, which led to an increase in the number and quality of publications.
34
While the incentive system in Turkey generally increased publications, it decreased the number of publications in SSCI/SCI/A&HCI and, therefore, the quality of publications. This difference can be attributed to cultural, psychological, and socio-economic reasons. The reasons need to be examined in further studies. Another issue to be considered is that many of the studies carried out in other countries correspond to years when fake journals and congresses were less prevalent. These journals and congresses have mushroomed in recent years. 35 Therefore, these countries that evidently experienced positive results from their incentive system may want to re-examine whether the incentive does indeed improve the quality of publications.
Theories about motivation expound that external factors like money can be an important source of motivation, but the influence vanishes when the external motivator disappears. Furthermore, it is also known that it is not extrinsic motivation but intrinsic motivation that is essentially influential on the quantity and especially the quality of performance.
36
Accordingly, policymakers who want to create a policy that maximizes performance should note that using only an external factor to motivate performance can ignore other causal relations and that its implementation may create new problems of its own. Policy-making of this kind can turn out to be an act of over-egging the pudding.
